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SUPRE:ME COURT'S 1998-1999 TERM: FOURTH 
AMENDMENT DECISIONS 
Kathryn R.Urbonya* 
JUDGE PRATT: 
At this point we are going to move into the Fourth Amendment, 
Supreme Court developments of last term from Professor Urbonya 
followed by some commentary by Judge Raggi in this area. 
PROF. URBONYA: 
Before I begin, how many of you have actually worked on a 
Section 1983 case involving a traffic stop? What I would like to 
start with are the traffic stop cases. But I would like to begin with 
Whren v. United States case, 1 which is an old case, just to give us a 
background of where we are going. Judge Raggi is going to be the 
commentator after my discussion. She had previously asked me if 
I had a theme for the cases. Today I respond to her question by 
stating two themes: expanding police powers and discarding the 
presumption of a warrant requirement. 
How often do we find a Fourth Amendment violation?2 Very 
rarely, the Court expanded police powers this term once again and 
created a paradigm shift. I guess that sounds very academic. 
Instead of asking, "Where is the warrant?" (we do not ask that 
question anymore), we ask, "What does the common law have to 
say?" If the common law does not answer the question, then we 
look to reasonableness. I can actually say that I have seen this shift 
in practice occur. I read one of the cases that is pending in the 
* Kathryn R. Urbonya is a Professor of Law at William and Mary School of 
Law. She is a fonner law clerk for United States District Judge G. Ernest 
Tidwell, Atlanta, Georgia, and North Dakota Supreme Court Justice Gerald W. 
Vande Walle. 
I 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This section provides in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall riot be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or aff~nnation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. Id. 
811 
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Supreme Court, the Wardlow case,3 and I was surprised to see that 
every single brief that was submitted talked about the common 
law. I hope all of us here in this room are historians and like to 
read dusty old cases, because the Court's Fourth Amendment 
analysis is rooted in interpreting the common law and expanding 
police powers. Let us dust off the history books, if we listen to the 
Supreme Court's col111llands and start looking at the historical 
roots of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Whren case,4 as many of you may remember, was a traffic 
stop case. The issue in Whren was about pretextual stops.5 We 
have all been reading in the newspapers about racial profiling, and 
many of you in the room have even been subject to it, but the 
Supreme Court said the issue is not whether the officer engaged in 
a pretextual traffic stop, the question is: Did the officer have a 
reason to stop this particular individual for a traffic violation~ In a 
very short paragraph the Supreme Court said, if race is at issue, do 
not use the Fourth Amendment, use the Equal Protection Clause.' 
The only question for the Fourth Amendment is: Did the officer 
have reason to believe the driver committed a traffic offense? As 
many of us know, that is not only speeding, but faulty lights, or not 
maintaining your lane correctly. Many reasons cause police 
officers to pull us over.8 Prior to the Whren case, the question was: 
3 People of the State of Illinois v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, (Ill. Dec. 1998), 
decided, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000) (holding that police officer had reasonable 
suspicion to forcibly stop a citizen in a high-crime neighborhood after ran 
"headlong" after seeing police). 
4 517 u.s. 806 (1996). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This section provides in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches an~ seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. Jd 
6 Whren, 517 U.S. at 808. 
7 !d. (stating that "[s]ubjective intentional play no role in ordinary, probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis"). 
8 !d. at 817. The Court acknowledged that an officer may have "probable 
cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of a multitude of applicable 
traffic and equipment regulations." Jd. at 817 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
u.s. 648 (1979). 
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What about ordering the driver out of the car? The officer stops us 
under Whren for a traffic case. The next question is: \Vhat else 
can the officer do? Well, the officer can order the driver out of the 
car under Pennsylvania v. Mimms.9 
The idea is officer safety. Then, a couple of terms ago, the court 
in Maryland v. Wilson, 10 asked what about passengers? The 
Supreme Court said, you can also order the passenger out of the 
car.11 If it is good for driver and officer safety, it is good for 
passenger and officer safety. 
In Ohio v. Robinette, 12 an issue arose after the officer stopped the 
driver, gave him a warning. As the officer returned the license, he 
said, "One question before you get going: Are you carrying any 
illegal contraband in the car?"13 The question before the Supreme 
Court was: once the officer concluded the traffic stop, did the 
officer have to say, "The stop is now over, you are free to go?"14 
The Court decided that the officer did not have to say that. Instead 
a totality of circumstances test applied.'s We also know from the 
Schneckloth16 case, under consent doctrine, that the police officer 
does not have to tell us our right to refuse the consent to the 
search.17 So, the officer can stop us, can order the driver out of the 
car and can order the passenger(s) out of the car.'8 Once it is over, 
the officer does not even have to tell us that we do not have to 
consent nor does he have to tell us the traffic stop is now over. 19 
9 436 u.s. 106 (1977). 
10 519 u.s. 408 (1997). 
11 Wilson, 519 U.S. at414-15. 
12 519 u.s. 33 (1996). 
13 /d. at 35-36. 
14 Robinette, 519 U.S. at35. 
15 /d. at 38. The Court explains that in view of the ... endless variations in the 
facts and circumstances' implicating the Fourth Amendment. ... the proper 
inquiry necessitates a consideration of 'all the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter."' !d. 
16 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
17 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249 (holding that the subject's knowledge of a 
right to refuse consent is a factor to be considered in determining the 
voluntariness of the consent. but the subject's knowledge of a right to consent is 
not a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent). 
18 See, e.g., Mimms, 436 U.S. 106; Wilson, 519 U.S. 408. 
19 See, e.g., Robinette, 519 U.S. 33; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218. 
814 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol 16 
How does this set the stage for last term's cases? Well, we also 
have to include Michigan v. Lonff0, which is an older case that 
dealt with searching the car and what the officer can do to search a 
car.21 In Michigan v. Long, the officer was able to search the 
passenger compartment of the car because the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to believe there was a dangerous weapon 
there.22 Typically, we think of an officer searching a car after an 
arrest. The idea is the officer arrests the driver and then searches 
the car. How many of you have actually been arrested for a traffic 
offense? Anyone here? There are no hands going up. How many 
of you have gotten citations? 
You have gotten lots of citations, and lots of warnings. In 
the Iowa case that I have cited in my materials, Knowles v. Iowa, 23 
there was a state statute that authorized a police officer to search 
the vehicle incident not to an arrest, but incident to a citation, and 
the question was the constitutionality of the statute. 24 In an 
amazing decision, the Supreme Court found a Fourth Amendment 
violation saying that the police officer could not search the car 
incident to a traffic citation, and in trying to decide this case, the 
Supreme Court did not look to history in this case; it just relied on 
precedent. The Court relied on the "search incident to an arrest" 
doctrine to say there is difference between arresting someone on 
one hand and going ahead and issuing a citation on the other 
hand.25 The Court said the two rationales that apply to "search 
incident to an arrest" just do not work in the context of a search 
incident to a citation.26 
First, the Supreme Court did recognize that traffic stops can 
be dangerous and that officers can be subject to some kind of 
danger, but the Supreme Court said, in contrast to an arrest where 
there is continuing custody with this person, a traffic stop is a very 
brief encounter. If the officers have reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the person is armed and dangerous, then the officers 
20 463 u.s. 1032 (1983). 
21 Long, at 1034-35. 
22 !d. at 1035. 
23 525 u.s. 113 (1998). 
24 Knowles, at 114. 
25 !d. at 117. 
26 !d. The Court stated: "Neither of these rationales for the search incident to 
arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case." !d. 
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can invoke the Terry doctrine and subject the person to a pat down 
in that situation for weapons.27 The Knowles Court explained that a 
traffic stop does not present that kind of danger to the officers. 28 
The second rationale under the search incident to an arrest 
doctrine was: What about the need to preserve evidence?29 \Vhen 
you arrest someone and you are about to go to the police station, 
the suspect may try to destroy evidence. First of all, the offense in 
this case was speeding. There is not going to be any further 
evidence to worry about whether the driver is going to throw this 
evidence away.30 Speeding is the offense. The Court said this was 
not a facial attack to the statute, it was just looking at the particular 
facts. Under these narrow facts, the search incident to arrest 
doctrine does not work.31 So officers cannot search our cars 
incident to a traffic citation. That is all the Knowles Court decided 
in this particular case. 
What about property that is in the car during a traffic stop? 
That is the Wyoming v. Houghton case.32 I encourage all of you to 
read that case in detail. That case dealt the property of a 
passenger, an issue the Supreme Court had not previously 
addressed. In that case, the officer had stopped the driver, pulled 
him over for speeding and a faulty brake light, and then noticed 
27 Id. at 117. The Court explained: 
I d. 
The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is 
a good deal less than in a case of custodial arrest In Robinson, we 
stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer because of 
the 'extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into 
custody and transporting him to the police station." We recognized 
that the danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, 
and its attendant proximity stress, and uncertainty, and not from the 
grounds for the arrest A routine traffic stop on the other hand I a 
relatively brief encounter and is "more analogous to a so-called Terry 
stop. 
28 Id. 
29 !d. at 118. 
30 Id. The Court explained: "Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and 
issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been 
obtained." Id. 
31 Id. at 119. The Court refused to extend the" 'bright line rule' to a situation 
where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the 
concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all." 
32 119 S. Ct 1297 (1999). 
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there was a hypodermic syringe in the driver's pocket. The officer 
ordered the driver out, and went to get gloves to protect his 
hands.33 As the driver was standing outside of the car, the officer 
asked the driver, "Why do you have a syringe?" As the Supreme 
Court says, with "refreshing candor,m4 the driver said, "for drugs." 
At that point, the officer had, according to the law, probable cause 
to believe there were drugs in the car. After the driver made that 
admission, the officer ordered the other two passengers out of the 
car, two female passengers; they had been sitting in the front seat. 
In the back seat, there was a purse.35 
The male driver and two female passengers were all outside 
the car now, and the officer asked one of the female passengers in 
this case, a woman named Sandra, "What is your name?" She 
said, "My name is Sandra James."36 Notice the case is Wyoming v. 
Houghton.31 She lied. The officer went and opened the purse, did 
not see the name "Sandra James", saw the name "Sandra 
Houghton", came back and said, "I see this purse says 'Sandra 
Houghton'. Is this your purse?" At that point she said, "Yes, it is 
mine." The officer searched the purse again and this time found 
drugs. 38 So the question for the Supreme Court was: What about 
the officer's ability to search that purse in the back seat for drugs? 
The lower court in this case talked about the ownership, did the 
officer have notice this purse did not belong to the male driver who 
was stopped for drugs, and the Supreme Court refused to adopt an 
ownership test for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.39 All the 
officer needed was to have probable cause to believe there were 
33 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299. 
34 !d. 
35 !d. 
36 !d. 
37 119 S. Ct. 1297. 
38 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299. 
39 !d. at 1303. The Court explained: 
!d. 
Once a 'passenger's property' exception to car searches became widely 
known, one would expect passenger-confederates to claim everything as 
their own. And one would anticipate a bog of litigation--.... We think 
[our determinations of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment] 
militate in favor ofthe needs of law enforcement, and against a personal-
privacy interest that is ordinarily weak. 
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drugs inside the car, and even though it is a purse, the officer could 
go ahead and search the purse for the drugs. 
One interesting line the Court drew in this case, which is 
not as clear as it sounds when you read all the opinions together, is 
that the officer could not search the person. The facts of the case, 
however, are limited to the searching of the purse that is inside the 
car.40 It could be a little confusing about the officer's ability to 
search the person. Yet the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio41 could apply 
if officers have reasonable suspicion that the person is anned and 
dangerous.42 The Court seems to implying that officers can search 
the property inside the car; but when the passengers are outside the 
car, they could not be subject to a frisk. 
This is an interesting line that the Court drew here. "3 
Another case deals with the warrantless search of a car. It is a very 
short opinion: Maryland v. Dyson44• It was a per curiam decision; 
it is under the automobile exception of the Fourth Amendment. 
The automobile exception goes back to the Carroll case45, the 
bootleg liquor case where the officer drove along the road trying to 
stop people from transporting illegal alcohol on the road, and the 
officer had probable cause to believe there was alcohol in a car in 
the Carroll case.46 In this case, the officer had probable cause to 
believe there were drugs in the car.47 
The automobile doctrine originally asked two questions: 
One, did the officer have probable cause to believe there was 
contraband in the car? And, two, were there exigent 
circumstances?48 The lower court in this case, the Maryland Court 
of Special Appeals, said that you have to make both findings, that 
is to say, you had to have both probable cause to believe there are 
40 !d. at 1302. The Court quoted Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 24-25 (1968) by 
stating: "Even a limited search of the outer clothing ... constitutes a severe, 
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an 
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." /d. 
41 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
42 Id. at 1304. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
43 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct at 1302. 
44 119 S. Ct. 2013 (1999). 
45 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
46 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160 
47 Dyson, 119 S. Ct at2014. 
48 Id. 
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drugs in the car and, also, that there are exigent circumstances. 49 
The Supreme Court said in a very short opinion, no, you only need 
to make one finding, you only need to have probable cause to 
believe there are drugs inside the car.50 A very short opinion, 
Maryland v. Dyson is an example of the scope of the automobile 
exception. 
Another important case is Florida v. White,51 which deals 
with a Florida forfeiture statute. In that case, the officers on 
several occasions observed the driver use his car for drug dealing. 52 
Under state forfeiture law, that car was contraband and 
could be seized. The question for the Court was: Could the 
officers, given all the facts in this case, seize that car in a public 
place without a warrant?53 The answer to the question was yes. 54 
It is a car being seized without a warrant. Why not get a 
warrant? This is part of a paradigm. Justice Stevens in his dissent 
said, Oh, by the way, what happened to the general rule that 
warrants are presumptively required?55 The Supreme Court had 
previously said that the idea of having police officers ask a 
magistrate for a warrant is impractical because the officers are 
often engaged in a "competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime."56 Justice Stevens in his dissent said, in this case, the 
officers are engaged in the "competitive and potentially lucrative 
enterprise of ferreting out crime. "57 That is not the question for the 
Court. 58 The question for the Court was not, whether the warrant is 
required, but how would we have decided this question at common 
law? 
Cars are a lot like ships, so, therefore, since, they are like 
ships under our old cases, the Carroll case (the bootleg case), let 
49 Dyson v. State ofMaryl~d, 122 Md. App. 413,424 (1998). 
50 Dyson, 119 S. Ct. at 2014. 
51 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999). 
52 White, 119 S. Ct. at 1557. 
53 Id at 1560. 
54 !d. 
55 !d. at 1561. Justice Stevens said: "Because the Fourth Amendment plainly 
protects property as well as privacy and seizures as well as searches, ... I would 
ap&ly to the present case our longstanding warrant presumption." !d. 
6 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
51 See White, supra, note 48, at 1563. 
58 !d. 
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officers go ahead and seize them. It is a five, two, two decision. I 
already mentioned Justice Stevens' dissent stating that officers 
should have a warrant. In this case Justice Souter and Justice 
Breyer agreed to go ahead and concur on this opinion, but warned 
the states, noting that just because they labeled something it 
contraband did not mean everything could be subject to an 
automatic seizure.59 In this case, the Court allowed forfeiture 
because the car was definitely related to the drug dealing that was 
going on. But not all seizures in all situations of contraband are 
going to be warrantless, according to the two judges.ro Notice it is 
a five, two, two decision, so there are five judges not putting any 
limits on this particular case. 
How does the paradigm shift also occur? It also happened 
in the passenger's property case. There are a lot of defense 
attorneys here, I would encourage you to look at how the Court 
frames the Fourth Amendment question there. Five judges very 
clearly say, the first question we have in a Fourth Amendment 
analysis is, at common law, would the practice have been 
unlawful~1 Five judges say that is the approach we should look at. 
If it would have been unlawful, we stop the inquiry there, but if we 
do not know from the common law, the Supreme Court said we 
can do our general reasonableness kind of balancing we ask for, 
looking at to see whether it is reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Five judges say we should look at the 
common law to determine the answer to the Fourth Amendment 
question. 
Another Fourth Amendment cases I want to talk about is 
Minnesota v. Carter,62 which dealt with the question attorneys 
would call it "standing," but the Supreme Court told us not to use 
the word "standing." The question is about whether the 
defendant's own rights were violated in a particular case. This 
case involves three individuals. Three individuals were in an 
apartment, a female and two males. An informant saw three of 
59 White, 119 S Ct. at 1560. (Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring). 
60 !d. (Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring). 
61 !d. at 1558. (Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring). 
62 119 S. Ct 469 (1998). 
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them sitting aronnd a table and noticed plastic bags and white 
powder; and the informant told the police officer of this activity.63 
The police officer was able to look inside the window 
because it was an apartment near the gronnd, and he was able to 
see through the blinds of this enterprise. 64 Based on this 
information, the officer got a warrant in this case. The question 
before the Supreme Court did not deal with the leaseholder of the 
apartment, it dealt with the two males that were present in the 
apartment and whether their own Fourth Amendment rights were 
implicated by the officer's observation. The Supreme Court said 
they were not. 65 The facts were that they were there for two and a 
half hours, that they were engaging in this criminal enterprise, and 
that they lived that Chicago, not Minnesota. This was just a 
fleeting time in this apartment, and, therefore, their own Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated, not even implicated.66 
The Supreme Court, once again, admonished all of us not 
to refer to this as a question of standing.67 It is a question of 
whether the visitor's reasonable expectation of privacy rights were 
violated in this particular case, and the Supreme Court said no. 
Interesting, five different votes, however, decided another 
issue that is not really directly raised in this case, but tangential to 
it. Justice Kennedy in his swing vote said, there is a difference, 
however, between the facts of this case, (involving a criminal 
enterprise, short-term, visitors who had never been in the 
apartment before) and social guests. Social guests do have their 
Fourth Amendment rights implicated by such conduct. With the 
dissent and Justice Kennedy's vote, if you are social guests inside 
someone's apartment, you do have your Fourth Amendment rights 
implicated and you can go ahead and challenge it. 63 
63 !d. at471-472. 
64 !d. 
65 See generally Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998). 
66 !d. 
67 !d. at 472. The Court stated: "Central to our analysis [is] the idea that in 
detennining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not 
someone else') Fourth Amendment rights, the "defmition of those rights is more 
properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than 
within that of standing." !d. 
68 !d. at 480-484. 
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The Supreme Court never had to get to the legality in this 
case of the officer peering through the window. Why? Because 
those individual males who were in the apartment do not have any 
Fourth Amendment rights even implicated by their presence in the 
apartmen~ because they are not social guests.69 The Supreme 
Court distinguished the prior case of A1innesota v. O/sen70, which 
dealt with an overnight guest, who definitely had "standing." 
Now, after Minnesota v. Carter11 , a social guest has "standing." I 
am not really supposed to say that: The social guest has an 
expectation of privacy. 72 
If you are just there briefly, engaging in a criminal 
enterprise, there is no ability to raise the Fourth Amendment as an 
issue. That is what the Supreme Court said. 
The Supreme Court, granted certiorari in October in United 
States v. Boru:f3. It is a bus case, and it is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy case. You all remember the standard from Katz14 about 
when you have a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment is that the defendant has a expectation of privacy and 
has conducted his or her actions in a manner to create a subjective 
expectation of privacy and the privacy is one that society 
recognizes reasonable.75 
This case, United States v. Bond, that the Court just granted 
certiorari in, is about a passenger on a bus. The bus is stopped at a 
permanent border checkpoint to check for illegal aliens on the bus. 
The officer went down the bus and checked everyone. As the 
officer came back up the bus, the officer started, (and this is the 
technical term) "squeezing" the defendant's luggage. That's all the 
information we get. Why do I say it is a technical term? That is 
because many lower courts have said - another technical term - if 
you "poof' somebody's luggage or "prep" somebody's luggage 
and you cause the air to circulate, that is not a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
69 !d. at 473-474. 
70 495 us 91 {1990). 
71 See Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998). 
72 !d. at 473. 
73 167F.3d225(5thCir.l999). 
74 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
75 See generally, Katz, supra, note 71. 
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Why would you "poof' somebody's luggage? So you can 
get the air moving, so either the officer can smell it or a dog can 
smell it. "Poofmg" and "prepping" are accepted in the lower 
courts, but we do not have "poofing" and "prepping" in this case. 
We have squeezing, and the Fifth Circuit said that the squeezing 
did not violate or implicate the Fourth Amendment because there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage in this manner. 76 
The Fifth Circuit did cite a Tenth Circuit case that went the other 
way on a different act. The ether act was pressing both sides of a 
luggage. 77 The way the lower courts have looked at it, I had great 
entertainment reading these cases. Many of the lower courts have 
asked the question: Is the luggage being touched in a manner that 
would be different from the way another passenger would touch 
the baggage? In a Seventh Circuit case, in which there was a 
dissent, the majority in the Seventh Circuit had allowed the officer 
to touch the baggage but not pull it out. A judge in this case 
dissented, stating that he could not imagine -- language of the 
Court - that federal judges would allow their baggage to be 
manipulated, squeezed in a manner to determine what the contents 
are. But stay tuned, we will find out at the end of the term whether 
the squeezing is a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment with respect to the bus stops we have here. That is 
United States v. Bond. 78 
The other case that was alluded to by Professor Schwartz 
this morning was Wilson v. Layne19, the media case where 
photographers and reporters went inside a house, and in another 
case we had CNN video taping the search. The Supreme Court 
said in this case, surprisingly, it did violate the Fourth Amendment 
to have the media along. 80 
The standard the Court used in this case was, when you 
have the media along, ·it is not aiding the execution of a warrant, 
and it gave a couple of examples of things that are probably 
76 See Bond, supra, note 70 at 227. 
77 See United States v. Nicholson, 144 F. 3d 632, 639 (101h Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the manipulation of luggage stored in an overhead luggage bin was 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
78 See Bond, supra, note 70. 
79 119 S. Ct. 162 (1999). 
80 Id. at 1699. 
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permissible. It said, if you, for example, are a person whose 
property has been stolen and you went along with the police 
officers to identify stolen property, then you would be aiding in the 
execution of a search warrant in that particular case. The Court 
also mentioned that police officers could video tape themselves, 
for example. Sometimes an officer may video tape for quality 
control to see what is going on, but the fact the media came in this 
case, the Court said did not aid in the execution, even though, as 
the Court said, it may be good PR for the officers, it did not really 
accept the arguments that the media were somehow going to make 
the search go a little better, protect the police officer in public. 
One last case pending in the Supreme Court, I think is an 
incredibly important case, is Illinois v. Wardlow.8' This case is 
about reasonable suspicion. An individual was in an asserted 
admittedly high crime neighborhood in Chicago around noontime. 
He stood on a comer, and four officers in a Caravan passed. (It is 
not clear from the record whether the officers were in marked or 
unmarked cars.~ The first car went past the defendant, who was 
standing on the comer with a white opaque bag in his hand. (We 
do not know whether the officers were in uniform or not) The 
defendant saw them. Then the second car went past, followed by 
the third car, and then the fourth.83 Each car had two had two 
officers. Wardlow, standing on the comer, looked at the officer 
and started to run in a high crime neighborhood, and as he ran, the 
fourth car started to follow him. \Vardlow ran down a gangway, 
and eventually Wardlow ran into the driver the fourth car.84 
The officer did not identify the purpose of the stop in this 
case, but immediately frisked him. The question in this case 
before the Supreme Court is: Does flight alone at the site of a 
police officer create reasonable suspicion or, if flight alone doesn't 
create reasonable suspicion, is flight plus being in a high-crime 
neighborhood enough to create reasonable suspicion?35 Justice 
Scalia in a prior decision had relied on an ancient source, the Bible, 
stating, "the wicked fleeth where no man runneth," and concluded 
81 701 N.E.2d484, (Ill. 1998). 
82 !d. at 484-86. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id at486. 
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that flight upon just seeing an officer is enough to create a 
reasonable suspicion.86 The Supreme Court decided that question 
this year and held that that kind of action creates reasonable 
suspicion for the stop in this case. 87 
86 See generally, Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
87 Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). On January 12, 2000, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's unprovoked flight in an area of heavy 
narcotics trafficking supported reasonable suspicion that defendant in criminal 
activity and justified stop. /d. 
